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They are hostile nations
the gifts we bring
even in good faith maybe
warp in our hands to
implements, to manoevers
Margaret Atwood
The idea of normative restraint is associated with the acceptance by
governments, especially those representing the leading states, of substan-
tive and procedural restrictions on their discretion to wage war, not as a
matter of morality, but as a matter of law. The Kellogg-Briand Treaty,
the Nuremberg Judgment, and the Charter of the United Nations for-
malized the renunciation of non-defensive claims to use force to resolve
international disputes with other governments.
However, these formal standards provide little assured restraint upon
state action. The decline of normative restraint can be seen in the broad-
ening of the definition of self-defense and in the increasing resort to uni-
lateral force by sovereign states. With this decline in the normative
restraints embodied in the United Nations Charter, an answer to the
question posed by the editors may be more a consideration of aspirational
norms than a description of the legal restraints generally operative in
state practice. Given these circumstances, this Article addresses the
question as to why there is a trend toward the decline of normative re-
straint with respect to unilateral uses of force, as well as factors that
might reverse this trend.
This decline in normative restraint can be partly understood as an in-
evitable outgrowth of these earlier legal efforts to limit use of force to
self-defense. The generality of these legal prohibitions left gray areas,
especially the failure to delineate boundaries upon the concept of self-
defense. For example, as Derek Bowett and others have argued, the idea
of self-defense does not obviously include a force option in alliance set-
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tings under the doctrinal rubric of collective self-defense. Also, the set-
ting of civil strife is not very clearly governed by this fundamental legal
regime. It seems possible, on almost any occasion, to present "interven-
tion" as "defensive" or as an instance of "counter-intervention."
The conclusion is that the legal effort to regulate recourse to force in
international relations has virtually collapsed in state-to-state relations,
including such institutional settings as those provided by the United Na-
tions. Representative expressions of this condition of legal collapse in-
clude: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979; the laissez-faire
approach to the Iran-Iraq War throughout its five years; Israel's discre-
tionary and frequent reliance on retaliatory and preemptive uses of force
against its Arab neighbors; and the United States government's blatant
reliance on extensive "covert operations" to overthrow the Sandinista
government together with its brazen repudiation of the authority of the
International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) in the Nicaraguan conflict.
There are some major factors accounting for this collapse of the legal
effort to regulate recourse to force. First, the militarization of the mod-
em state has led to an increased concern for security and for an increased
influence of military interests, especially in the two superpowers. Na-
tional security policy eludes constitutional and domestic legal constraints
even in countries with a strong formal structure of governmental ac-
countability. Thus, it is a reasonable generalization to suggest that if
domestic law is suspended, then international law is virtually irrelevant
to the policy-forming process; in essence, 1984 may be over, but "1984"
dominates relations between state and civil society on the issues of war
and peace.
Second, the prestige and capabilities of the political organs of the
United Nations, and of regional institutions, have not evolved as either a
challenge to, or a restraint upon, "illegal" uses of force. The notion of an
international security system has been abandoned in practice, even
though the Charter of the United Nations proclaims its possibility and
necessity.
Finally, the United States government has altered by 180 degrees its
attitude toward the relevance of international law to foreign policy. The
Reagan Administration, through its repudiation of the Law of the Sea
Treaty and its steady attack on international institutions, has extended
an emerging bipartisan dissatisfaction about the flow of international
normative attitudes. In the early postwar years when world public opin-
ion and the law were consistently on our side it was easy to support the
United Nations and the basic renunciation of non-defensive force; the
high point of this stance was the American conduct of the Korean War
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under UN flags. With the entry onto the world scene of former colonies
from Asia and Africa, the international political environment shifted.
The United States government from the early 1960s onward was as com-
mitted to the containment of Third World normative grievances as it was
to the containment of Soviet power. The result of this dual and often
contradictory policy has been a normative vacuum on the international
stage as "leadership" from dominant states has degenerated once again
into power politics, and warfare is assessed by outcomes (winning and
losing) and interests (vital or not), rather than by adherence to and im-
plementation of norms and procedures for peaceful settlement and legal
responsibility.
If further documentation of this set of developments is required, it can
be found in recent international practice and doctrinal formulations of
state policy. The U.S. invasion of Grenada and indirect military harass-
ment of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua is expressive of this new
willingness by the United States to self-justify uses of force that it would
unconditionally condemn if undertaken by others, uses of force that
would almost certainly be condemned in any appraisal conducted by im-
partial third-party procedures. Soviet behavior in Afghanistan and East-
ern Europe, similarly, expresses disregard of normative restraints,
including the most basic sovereign rights of countries on its borders.
However, the Soviet government, somewhat understandably given the
hostile international reception in the early years of its existence, has al-
ways regarded the law relating to force as an instrumental tool to be
wielded against enemies, or at most a convenient mechanism to stabilize
relations for mutual benefit, but not as a serious source of restraint in
handling antagonistic aspects of its own foreign relations. Similarly, the
Third World, experiencing and perceiving international law mainly as a
rationale for colonial subjugation and economic exploitation, was not dis-
posed to respect normative restraints upon its pursuit of interests. The
entire experience of recovering sovereignty was too new to be very conge-
nial to a program for its drastic curtailment. Thus, recent United States
shifts in policy, toward international law generally and the recourse to
using force specifically, are especially significant indicators of the decline
in normative restraint.
On a doctrinal level, two recent formulations by the U.S. Secretaries of
State and Defense confirm these basic generalizations about the weaken-
ing of legal effort to restrain recourse to force in international relations.
Secretary of State Shultz propounded a new anti-terrorist doctrine in a
speech at the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York City on October 25,
1984. In the speech, Shultz claimed a broad discretionary right on behalf
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of the United States to use force to combat terrorist threats abroad, in-
cluding a pre-announced policy to make preemptive strikes in foreign
countries: "We will need the flexibility to respond to terrorist attacks in
a variety of ways, at times and places of our own choosing. . . . If we
are going to respond or preempt effectively, our policies will have to have
an element of unpredictability and surprise."1 There is little place for
normative restraint or third-party procedures of review, beyond Mr.
Shultz's self-serving and unconvincing rhetoric: "I can assure you that
in this Administration our actions will be governed by the rule of law;
and the rule of law is congenial to action against terrorists." 2
The character of this discretionary and unilateral approach to war now
pursued by the United States was most comprehensively discussed in
Secretary of Defense Weinberger's talk to the National Press Club on
November 28, 1984. The Secretary's remarks were set forth as a doctrine
of restraint and even treated in the media as a critical comment on the
rather dangerous implication of adopting Shultz's anti-terrorist doctrine.
Mr. Weinberger set forth six tests to govern the foreign use of combat
force by the United States government:
(1) Force should be used only for vital interests;
(2) If used, then it should be dedicated to winning;
(3) Winning should be clearly defined in relation to political and military
objectives;
(4) The military capabilities required to win should be provided, and ad-
justed during the course of combat as necessary;
(5) The whole undertaking should not be attempted without "some reason-
able reassurance" of broad backing by the American people and Congress;
(6) The commitment to force should be a last resort. 3
Without belaboring the point, the relevant feature of these tests is their
"freedom" from normative restraint. Not even a reference is made to the
prohibition in international law on non-defensive uses of force. For in-
stance, "vital interests" might certainly encompass resource and invest-
ment issues. The idea of "winning" is restored to respectability, despite
its rather menacing implications in the nuclear age and in the teeth of the
painful outcomes of the main military confrontations of the Cold War-
in Korea and Vietnam. Yet from a legalistic perspective, what is striking
is the absence of any "test" to reconcile a proposed use of force with
international law requirements, including the commitment to seek peace-
ful settlement. The United Nations is never mentioned, even to establish
1. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1984, at A12, col. 2.
2. Id.
3. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1984, at Al, col. 3.
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the context. What emerges, then, is the U.S. government's unilateralist
stance on doctrine, as well as practice, toward the use of force, with the
main restraint being a domestic popularity poll (most probably, the ap-
plication of a Vietnam lesson) along with the beneficial endorsement of
force as a last resort for U.S. foreign policy. In other parts of the speech
Mr. Weinberger makes clear that indirect uses of force (via covert opera-
tions as in Central America, or by "friends" and allies) are governed by
an even more expansive mandate.
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These recent policy statements by U.S. officials are the only explicit
formulation of U.S. policy toward the use of force. It is significant, then,
to note the absence of any effort to reconcile the commitment to avoid
nuclear war while retaining discretion to use nuclear weapons in response
to unacceptable behavior by enemies. Unlike other nuclear powers, the
United States seeks to keep an adversary guessing as to when nuclear
weapons might be introduced into battle (so-called "extended deter-
rence"). This tactic contrasts with the formal renunciations of first use
posited by both the Soviet Union and China (Great Britain, France, and
Israel and such other ambiguous nuclear powers as India and South Af-
rica have been silent on their doctrines of use). The extended deterrence
policy also conflicts with most normative (legal and moral) interpreta-
tions of international law that either amount to unconditional prohibi-
tions or, at most, authorize discriminate and proportional retaliatory
uses (that is, second uses). Here again, the Reagan Administration has
intensified the trends of its predecessors, rather than striking out in any
new direction.
In essence, ever since the use of the atomic bomb at the end of World
War II, the United States government has insisted on retaining the nu-
clear option as an instrument of statecraft, especially in superpower rela-
tions. This position reflects an underlying, and probably exaggerated
faith that the technological dynamism of the West in the nuclear context
is needed to counterbalance the Eurasian geographical position, the mo-
bilized manpower, and the regimentation of civil society possessed by the
Soviet Union (whether augmented or diminished by China). This geopo-
litical calculation has made it impossible to halt the arms race; arms con-
trol, at most, channels and alters the pace of innovation. Such a
discretionary approach to nuclear weapons has also underscored the re-
fusal of the leading state in the world to subject the most awesome dan-
gers of military power to the restraining effects of a legal regime.
4. Id.
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This appraisal of normative decline has expressed the existing circum-
stances in a manner as free from illusion and rhetorical pretension as
possible. Does it imply an endorsement of these trends or a renunciation
of the effort to bring international law to bear? Not at all. The emphasis
here is intended to clarify the extent to which the future of normative
restraint depends on the energies of civil society rather than on the good
will of governments, even those that represent the liberal democracies.
Putting the point differently, it was the energies of civil society that
curbed the militarist excesses of royalty in thirteenth-century England
and produced the Magna Charta. International law, if it is to be effective
in the war/peace area, will develop more in response to pressure from
citizens for a lawful foreign policy than as a shift in official stance by the
leading governments of the world.
There is not an inconsiderable trend to this effect. The Lawyers' Com-
mittee on Nuclear Policy is seeking to gain public support for an Ameri-
can position on nuclear weapons that takes greater account of normative
restraint as embodied in international law (as the U.S. Catholic Bishops
did in their 1981 pastoral letter with regard to ethics and morality). Var-
ious groups of activists have been engaged in non-violent civil disobedi-
ence for the purpose of challenging the legality of different elements of
nuclear weapons policy and of the role of the CIA in the war being
waged against Nicaragua. Defendants in these cases, of which there are
now several dozen, place principal reliance on "the Nuremburg obliga-
tion" (the right, and possibly, the duty of American citizens to oppose
violations of the law of peace by their own government) and on an al-
leged constitutional guarantee (in article VI, section 2) of a lawful foreign
policy. Courts have traditionally been wary of challenging the President
in matters of foreign policy, but recently citizen challenges have begun to
receive some encouragement, most notably in a Vermont case in which
the judge charged a jury that they could accept a necessity defense to
criminal trespass if they believed the expert testimony to the effect that
official policies in Central America were in violation of international
law.
5
As should be obvious, I believe that consistent and principled adher-
ence to international law serves the interests of the American people at
this stage of history, regardless of what other governments might do.
That is, violations of international law tend to be self-destructive, as well
as destructive of international order. Note that this orientation does not
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embrace an ethic of nonresistance. It does not, on legal or policy
grounds, deny the option of governments to use defensive force, nor does
it even confine defensive force to a strict reading of Article 51 of the UN
Charter (requiring a prior armed attack and an immediate submission of
the defensive claim to the Security Council for action and review). The
United Nations is currently too weak to bear this burden, and other ma-
jor states are obviously not inclined to adapt their foreign policies to such
a framework of restraint.
And yet, even the self-interpretation of legal restraint could make a
difference in several directions: of primary importance is adherence to
the minimum standards of legal prohibition applicable to nuclear weap-
onry, that is, the renuciation of "extended deterrence" and the limitation
of the nuclear option to second strike or retaliatory roles. Adherence to
the legal prohibitions bearing on respect for the dynamics of self-determi-
nation and norms of non-intervention would provide additional restraint.
Under this standard, support for rebels in the Afghanistan setting is le-
gally permissible to neutralize Soviet intervention, but is not possible in
Central America where such prior illegal intervention is either trivial or
nonexistent. However, the government of Nicaragua would still enjoy
sovereign rights to obtain military assistance from its friends, especially
when faced with a military threat from exile elements. Finally, restraint
would be provided through adherence to legal prohibitions on indiscrimi-
nate and disproportionate retaliatory uses of force to combat terrorism
(in effect, a commitment to deal with terrorism by means other than
counter-terrorism).
These steps toward a law-oriented foreign policy would contribute to
the safety and security of the American people, as well as to that of the
world. The genuine adoption of such a stance by the U.S. government
would restore the diplomatic stature of the United States as a world
leader. However, it is implausible to expect such perspectives to become
influential in policy-making arenas without a surge of citizen activism
that carries with it a practical program for making constitutional govern-
ment effective once again in the context of national security policy. One
of the least appreciated features of the post-1945 setting of world affairs
is the extent to which the nuclear menace and the global American role
have made mobilization for war a permanent and routine feature of
American governance, thereby restricting to tactical detail, when it
comes to assessing national security policy, the relevance of national elec-
tions, of public criticism, and of congressional opposition. In sum, with-
out the restoration of real democracy, it is futile to expect international
law to play much of a role in restraining foreign policy, considering how
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militarized in outlook and posture the U.S. government has become. Fi-
nally, this dynamic of militarization produces a much wider authoriza-
tion for the use of force in international relations than serves either the
interests of the American people or expresses their values as embodied in
their overall civilizational identity.
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